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Abstract
Background: Hyperbolic discounting of delayed and probabilistic outcomes has drawn attention
in psychopharmacology and neuroeconomics. Sozou's evolutionary theory proposed that
hyperbolic delay discounting may be totally attributable to aversion to a decrease in subjective
probability of obtaining delayed rewards (SP) which follows a hyperbolic decay function. However,
to date, no empirical study examined the hypothesis, although this investigation is important for
elucidating the roles of impatience, precaution, and uncertainty aversion in delay discounting
processes.
Methods: In order to (i) determine the functional form of the relation between delay until receipt
and SP, and (ii) examine whether delay discounting is attributable to a decrease in SP, we assessed
the subjects' SP and their delay and probability discounting. We examined the fitness of hyperbolic
and exponential functions to the assessed SP, and relations between the SP, and delay/probability
discounting, and subjective-probability discounting for delayed rewards.
Results: The results demonstrated (a) SP decayed hyperbolically as delay increases, (b) a decay of
SP was associated with delay discounting, and (c) subjective-probability discounting did not
significantly correlate with delay discounting.
Conclusion: Our results demonstrated (i) hyperbolic decay of SP is related to delay discounting,
and (ii) delay discounting is, however, not attributable to precautious foresight in intertemporal
choice. Further, a novel parameter of pure time preference is proposed.
Background
Delay discounting
People prefer an immediate reward to a delayed one
(referred to as "delay discounting"). Psychopharmacolog-
ical and neuroeconomic studies have demonstrated that
drug-dependence, attention-deficit/hyperactivity disor-
ders (ADHDs) are associated with greater delay discount-
ing (referred to as "impulsivity" in intertemporal choice
[1-10]). Impulsivity in delay discounting processes may
consist of two types of psychological processes: (i) aver-
sion to waiting (or inability to wait) for the delayed
rewards (referred to as "pure time preference" or "impa-
tience" in intertemporal choice [6]) and (ii) aversion to
uncertainty associated with delay [9,11,12]. If delay dis-
counting occurs due only to uncertainty aversion [13],
strong discounting of delayed rewards ("impulsivity" in
Published: 25 September 2007
Behavioral and Brain Functions 2007, 3:52 doi:10.1186/1744-9081-3-52
Received: 28 May 2007
Accepted: 25 September 2007
This article is available from: http://www.behavioralandbrainfunctions.com/content/3/1/52
© 2007 Takahashi et al; licensee BioMed Central Ltd. 
This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0), 
which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.Behavioral and Brain Functions 2007, 3:52 http://www.behavioralandbrainfunctions.com/content/3/1/52
Page 2 of 11
(page number not for citation purposes)
intertemporal choice) should not be regarded as impair-
ment in self-control (i.e., impatience), but as a forward-
looking and risk-aversive tendency (precautious uncer-
tainty aversion). On the contrary, if impulsive delay dis-
counting is associated with impatience; i.e., simple
aversion to waiting for delayed rewards (also referred to as
"pure time preference"), subjects with greater delay dis-
counting (e.g., substance abusers and ADHD patients)
may have impaired self-control (e.g., impatience or
impulsivity in psychiatry's sense, see Appendix I) [7,14].
Although dissociating delay discounting processes into
these subcomponents is important for a better under-
standing of impulsive behaviors and establishing better
medical treatments, to date, no study has successfully
achieved the dissociation, partly due to a lack of good the-
oretical frameworks in the previous empirical investiga-
tions. By utilizing an evolutionary theory proposed by
Sozou [13], our present study examined the relationship
between delay discounting, uncertainty aversion as a sub-
component of delay discounting (i.e., "subjective-proba-
bility discounting" for delayed rewards, which
psychologically corresponds to "precautious uncertainty
aversion" in intertemporal choice) and pure uncertainty
aversion (probability discounting). Because a recent study
reported that nicotine addicts evaluated delayed rewards
as less certain than non-smokers [9], the present study
may help understand impulsivity and inconsistency in
intertemporal choice (see Appendix I for a distinction
between impulsivity and inconsistency) by drug-depend-
ent patients and substance misusers.
Standard economic theory has assumed that a discount
rate is independent of D  (dynamic consistency, see
Appendix I for details) [6], leading to the exponential dis-
count function (see Appendix II for mathematical charac-
teristics of exponential discounting):
VD = Aexp(-kdD)
where  VD  is the subjectively discounted value of the
reward at delay D, A is the undiscounted value of the
reward = VD(D = 0), D is the delay to the receipt of the
reward, and kd  is a free parameter [6]. The larger kd
becomes, the more rapidly a subject discounts the delayed
reward (more impulsive intertemporal choice). However,
empirical studies in humans and non-human animals
reported that delay discounting is better described by the
hyperbolic function (see Appendix II for mathematical
characteristics of hyperbolic discounting) [1-10]:
VD = A/(1+kdD)
with the same notations as in Equation 1. Again, a larger
kd value corresponds to more rapid discounting. There-
fore, in hyperbolic discounting, subjects underestimate
their future impulsivity, resulting in preference reversal as
time passes (also referred to as dynamic inconsistency, see
Appendix I) [6,7]. Because normative decision theory and
microeconomics state that hyperbolic discounting is not
rational (see Appendix I and II), previous studies have
investigated why human and animal intertemporal choice
is hyperbolic [6,7,13,15,16]. However, we still do not
have the final answer to this question. It is important to
understand psychological processes underlying hyper-
bolic discounting, because problematic behaviors in tem-
poral discounting (e.g., loss of self-control in drug-
dependent patients and substance misusers) are associ-
ated with inconsistency, rather than impulsivity, in inter-
temporal choice (see Appendix I) [7]. Therefore, studies in
the nascent field of neuroeconomics attempted to eluci-
date neural correlates of inconsistency in intertemporal
choice (hyperbolicity in temporal discounting) [15,16],
in addition to impulsivity in intertemporal choice.
Sozou's hypothesis on hyperbolic delay discounting
One of the accounts for delay discounting is that delayed
rewards are discounted because more delayed rewards are
more uncertain. In order to explain hyperbolic discount-
ing for delayed rewards, an evolutionary theorist Sozou
proposed the following two assumptions [13]:
(A) subjective probability of obtaining delayed rewards
decays hyperbolically,
(B) the subjective value of a delayed reward equals a sta-
tistical expected value in terms of subjective probability.
It is to be noted that assumption B excludes the psycho-
logical process of aversion to waiting for a delayed reward
(impatience) from candidate accounts for (impulsivity in)
delay discounting.
Let us briefly see the mathematical characteristics of
Sozou's hypothesis (see Appendix III for details). Because
an exponential decay function [13]:
SP(D) = exp(-kspD),
where ksp indicates a decay rate of SP as delay D increases,
cannot explain hyperbolic delay discounting, Sozou has
proposed that SP(D) follows the hyperbolic decay func-
tion [11]:
SP(D) = 1/(1+kspD),
in order to derive the hyperbolic delay-discounting func-
tion. Note that larger ksp indicates a more rapid decay of SP
as delay increases; i.e., a high degree of "precaution" in
intertemporal choice. Note also that ksp does not measure
subject's aversion to uncertainty associated with delay, butBehavioral and Brain Functions 2007, 3:52 http://www.behavioralandbrainfunctions.com/content/3/1/52
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simply measure subject's estimation of potential risk fac-
tors in the future.
To date, no study examined the validity of the key
assumption (A). One of the objectives of the present study
is to directly examine whether SP(D) follows the expo-
nential or hyperbolic function, in order to test the Sozou's
assumption A. Moreover, studies in probability discount-
ing (devaluation of uncertain rewards) imply that
assumption (B) may not always be correct, because the
subjective value of an uncertain reward does not exactly
equal the statistical expected value (explained below).
Probability discounting
Subjects discount the value of uncertain rewards as the
probability of receiving the rewards decreases [3,8,11,17].
This behavioral tendency has been referred to as "proba-
bility discounting" (psychologically, also referred to as
"uncertainty aversion"). Rachlin et al [17] have proposed
the following exponential and hyperbolic probability-dis-
counting functions:
Vp = Aexp(-kpO)
and
Vp = A/(1+kpO),
where Vp is a subjective discounted value of a probabilistic
reward, A is the value when p = 1, O is the odds against =
(1/p)-1 (proportional to an average waiting time in a
repeated gambling), and kp is the probability discount
rate. kp indicates the degree to which one discounts the
uncertain reward. Several studies found that hyperbolic
probability discounting function (Equation 6) fits the
behavioral data better than the exponential discount func-
tion (Equation 5). Recently, a psychopharmacologist
Bickel's group invented a framework combining delay and
probability discounting [11]. We therefore adopted kp as
subject's uncertainty aversion parameter (note that larger
kp corresponds to strong uncertainty aversion).
Discounting of delayed rewards due to decrease in 
subjective probability
Let us again consider discounting of delayed rewards
occurring due to aversion to uncertainty associated with
delay (i.e., "precautious uncertainty aversion" in intertem-
poral choice), rather than due to impatience. The "precau-
tious uncertainty aversion" in intertemporal choice is a
result of both "precaution" (i.e., estimation of potential
risks in the future) and "uncertainty aversion" (i.e., aver-
sion to the estimated risks in the future). It is to be noted
that, as can be seen from the hyperbolic probability-dis-
counting function (Equation 6), the subjective value of an
uncertain reward in Rachlin's model is equal to a statisti-
cal expected value if and only if kp = 1 (because A/(1+1 ×
[(1/p)-1]) = pA). Therefore, Sozou's assumption B may
exactly be true only when kp = 1. In contrast, when kp is not
equal to 1, the assumption (B) should be modified as:
(B') the subjective value of a delayed reward equals the
subjective value of an uncertain reward in terms of subjec-
tive probability.
Hence, if the assumption (B') (in other words, delay dis-
counting is totally attributable to precautious uncertainty
aversion; i.e., hyperbolic subjective-probability discount-
ing due to a decrease in SP as delay increases) is correct,
the subjective value of a delayed reward VD should follow
the (hyperbolic) subjective-probability discounting func-
tion:
VD (SP) = A/(1+kspdOsp) = A/(1+kspd[(1/SP)-1]),
where SP is a subjective probability of obtaining the
reward at each delay D, subjective odds-against Osp is
defined as (1/SP)-1 and the parameter kspd indicates the
degree of "precautious uncertainty aversion"; in other
words, the degree to which a subject discount the delayed
reward due, solely, to aversion to subjective uncertainty
associated with delay (not due to aversion to waiting; i.e.,
impatience). The independent variable of the subjective-
probability discounting function is SP at delay D, not
delay D per se. Therefore, larger kspd corresponds to the
degree of a forward-looking but precautious and risk-aver-
sive tendency.
Objectives of the present study
This study had three main goals: (i) to determine the func-
tional form of subjective probability of obtaining delayed
rewards (SP) as a function of delay, (ii) to examine the
relationship between the decay rate of SP(D) (i.e., ksp
which indicates the degree of "precaution" in intertempo-
ral choice) and rates of delay and probability discounting
(kd and kp, which indicate the degrees of impulsivity in
intertemporal choice and uncertainty aversion in probabi-
listic choice, respectively), (iii) to examine whether sub-
jective-probability discounting for delayed rewards (i.e.,
kspd, which indicates the degree of "precautious uncer-
tainty aversion" in intertemporal choice) is associated
with delay discounting (i.e., kd). If kspd (precautious uncer-
tainty aversion) and kd (impulsivity, which consists of
both "impatience" and "precautious uncertainty aver-
sion") are strongly correlated, impulsivity in intertempo-
ral choice (i.e., delay discounting) is predominantly be
explained by precautious uncertainty aversion (i.e., sub-
jective-probability discounting due to uncertainty associ-
ated with delay), rather than impatience.Behavioral and Brain Functions 2007, 3:52 http://www.behavioralandbrainfunctions.com/content/3/1/52
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In order to assess subjects' SP, we developed a subjective
probability questionnaire (SPQ) explained later. It should
be noted that, if Sozou's hypothesis is perfectly correct, (i)
SP as a function of delay may be hyperbolic rather than
exponential (from Sozou's assumption A), and (ii) ksp and
kd  are positively correlated (predicted from Sozou's
hypothesis), and (iii) kspd and kd may be positively corre-
lated (from assumption B'). Alternatively, if a delay in
intertemporal choice, via distinct psychological processes,
induces both "impatience" and "precaution" (i.e., a
decrease in SP), ksp and kd may be significantly correlated,
but no significant correlation may be observed between
kspd and  kd. Because Sozou's and Rachlin's theories are
irrelevant to the effects of the sign (i.e., gain or loss) and
the magnitude of delayed outcomes on discounting
behavior [6,18], we did not examine these effects in the
present study.
Methods
Participants
Thirty-one college students (age: 19.4 ± 0.3) were
recruited (13 men, 18 women) at the University of Tokyo.
Past or present smokers or substance abusers were
excluded from participation in this experiment.
Delay and probability discounting tasks
First, participants performed the delay/probability dis-
counting task. It is to be noted that we have previously
developed and utilized exactly the same Japanese version
of the discounting task [14], and the paper-and-pencil dis-
counting tasks were originally developed by Bickel's group
[19].
Participants were requested to choose alternatives based
solely on their free will, as if choices were about real
money [14,19]. Instructions for each questionnaire were
written on the top of each page of the questionnaire, and
expressed the temporal distance of delay (1 week, 2 weeks,
1 month, 6 month, 1 year, 5 years, 25 years, each page
included each delay and delays were presented in this
order) in the delay condition, and the probability for
uncertain reward (95%, 90%, 70%, 50%, 30%, 10%, 5%,
each page included each probability, and probabilities
were presented in this order) in the probability condition.
Two columns of hypothetical money amounts were listed
below the instructions. The right column (standard
amount) contained 40 rows of a fixed magnitude of
money (= 1,000 yen). The left column (adjusting
amount) listed ascending or descending magnitudes of
money in 2.5% increments (= 1000 yen × 0.025 = 25 yen)
of the alternative in the right column. Participants were
instructed to choose between the two alternatives in each
row of the questionnaire. Furthermore, as in the Bickel
and colleagues' discounting task, participants were
directed to attend to the directions on the top of each page
(containing each delay or probability) of the question-
naire, as the temporal distance would change over the
course of experiment. Thus, subjects chose between
delayed-standard amount and immediate-adjusted
amount of money in the delay condition, and between
uncertain-standard amount and certain-adjusted amount
of money in the probability condition. The order of the
descending and ascending conditions was counterbal-
anced.
The indifference points of delay and the probability tasks
were defined as the means of the largest adjusting value in
which the standard alternative was preferred and the
smallest adjusting value in which the adjusting alternative
was preferred. Next, the mean of the indifference point in
ascending and descending adjusting amounts were calcu-
lated for the delay and probability conditions in each par-
ticipant.
Subjective probability questionnaire (SPQ)
In addition, we asked the subjects to estimate the subjec-
tive probability of obtaining a reward (SP) with delays
corresponding to the delay discounting task. In order to
develop a questionnaire for the assessment of SP (SPQ),
we modified the questionnaire in Reynolds' studies
[9,12], in which participants were asked to rate their psy-
chological certainties for delayed rewards on a 1–10 point
rating scale ("delay-discounting certainty questionnaire",
DDCQ) [9,12]. SPQ was employed because (a) the
DDCQ is not appropriate for assessing the value of partic-
ipants' subjective probability of obtaining a delayed
reward, and (b) the objective of the present study was to
determine the functional form of SP(D), which is crucial
for testing Sozou's theory [13]. Participants were
instructed as follows (in Japanese):
You had chosen alternatives between immediate and
delayed rewards. Please again imagine as if the ques-
tions were about real monetary rewards.
If you had chosen the money delayed by 1 week, [the
delays were different for each question], how were you
sure you would actually get that money in 1 week?
Please answer your subjective probability of obtaining
the delayed reward in the unit of percentage.
The same question was repeated with corresponding
delays (1 week, 2 weeks, 1 month, 6 months, 1 year, 5
years, 25 years, in this order, similarly to previous studies
[9,12]). As in Patak and Reynolds' studies [9,12], partici-
pants were given minimal instruction on completing SPQ,
except to "answer each question based on the intertempo-
ral choice questions just completed". The discounting
tasks and SPQ procedures were conducted in the order of
delay discounting, probability discounting, and SPQ. TheBehavioral and Brain Functions 2007, 3:52 http://www.behavioralandbrainfunctions.com/content/3/1/52
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rationale for employing this order is that (i) the behavio-
ral data in the delay discounting task was the most impor-
tant, (ii) conducting SPQ (which make participants to
associate delay with probability) before the probability
discounting task may artificially strengthen the subjective
association between probability and delay in the proba-
bility discounting task. It is also to be noted that the
orders of the delay and probability discounting tasks did
not affect indifference points in our previous study [8].
Data analysis
Indifference points for individual and group median data
were obtained in order to compare the goodness-of-fit
between the exponential and the hyperbolic models in
delay and probability discounting. The data of one subject
did not show the consistency for defining the indifference
point (i.e., because there were two switching points at the
same delay, the indifference point at the delay could not
be defined) in delay discounting and therefore were
excluded from further analysis [8].
Subjective probabilities (SPs) of obtaining delayed
rewards were also obtained and the goodness-of-fit was
examined, for the hyperbolic and the exponential decay
models, at individual and group levels. For each discount-
ing/decay model, we performed a nonlinear regression in
order to estimate a free parameter in the model. Next, we,
with the estimated best-fit parameters, calculated the
Akaike information criterion with small sample correc-
tion (AICc, a second order AIC) for exponential and
hyperbolic functions in delay, probability, and subjective-
probability discounting, and a subjective probability
decay, respectively [20]. It should be noted that the defi-
nition of the second order AIC is: AICc : = - 2 Ln ([Residual
Sum of Squares]/n) +2Kn/(n-K-1), where Ln is a natural
log,  K  is the number of estimated parameters in the
model, n is the sample size [21]. We have utilized AICc in
the present study because n/K < 40 [20,21]. Note that the
smaller AICc becomes, the better a model approximates
the data [21]. Although AICc, in general, indicates a trade-
off between overfitting and poor fitting [21], AICc indi-
cates a goodness-of-fit in the present study. The reason is
that all the models (i.e., exponential and hyperbolic dis-
counting/decay models) contain the same number of a
free parameter (= 1) in the present study. For statistical
comparisons of AICcs at the individual level between
models, we utilized t-tests [20], because the Kolmogorov-
Smirnov tests did not revealed a significant deviation
from the normal distribution (ps > 0.05) [20]. It is to be
noticed that when R-square values were employed, essen-
tially the same results were obtained.
After confirming that hyperbolic models better fit the data
than exponential models for all behavioral data (i.e.,
delay discounting, probability discounting, SP(D)(i.e., SP
at each delay D), and subjective-probability discounting,
see Results), we examined relationship between k param-
eters (i.e., kd, kp, ksp and kspd) in the hyperbolic models (not
in the exponential models). Because the k parameters did
not distribute normally (Kolmogorov-Smirnov test, ps <
0.05), correlations between k parameters (i.e., kd, kp, ksp
and kspd in the hyperbolic models) were assessed by non-
parametric (Spearman's rank-order) correlation tests. It is
important to note that, if kspd is significantly correlated
with kd, delay discounting may mainly be attributable to
precautious uncertainty aversion (subjective-probability
discounting due to a decrease in SP as delay increases)
[13].
All statistical procedures were conducted with R statistical
language (the R project for statistical computing). The
alpha level was set at 0.05 throughout (for multiple com-
parisons, Bonferoni's correction was utilized).
Results
Relation between delay and probability discounting rates
Delay and probability discounting functions fit to behav-
ioral data of group median indifference points are shown
in Fig. 1a and 1b. Fig. 1a shows the group median of each
indifference points in the delay discounting. Fig. 1b shows
the probability discounting with a horizontal axis as an
odds against. AICcs for group data showed better fit
(smaller values) for hyperbolic functions (Table 1), con-
sistent with previous studies [1-11]. When AICcs for indi-
vidual discounting data were calculated, hyperbolic
discount functions also significantly better fit individual
data than exponential functions (t-tests, ps < 0.01, for all
comparisons), also suggesting that subjects discounted
delayed and probabilistic rewards hyperbolically.
Each individual's kd and kp were estimated by Equation 2
and 10 for delay and probability discounting, respectively
(Table 2). Spearman's correlation coefficients (rho)
between two parameters were shown in Table 3. There was
no significant correlation between kd and kp (ps > 0.1), in
line with recent studies reporting that delay and probabil-
ity discount rates are at best weakly correlated [3,8,22].
Comparison of exponential and hyperbolic SP decay 
functions
We compared the fitness of hyperbolic and exponential
functions to subjectively estimated probability (SP) func-
tion in terms of delay. Fig. 2 shows the SP (subjective
probability estimation of obtaining delayed rewards) as a
function of delay. As observed in the discounting func-
tions, the data showed better fit for a hyperbolic, rather
than an exponential function (see Table 1), supporting
assumption A in the hypothesis by Sozou. Likewise, AICcs
for individual data were significantly smaller for hyper-
bolic than exponential function (t-test, p < 0.05), againBehavioral and Brain Functions 2007, 3:52 http://www.behavioralandbrainfunctions.com/content/3/1/52
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supporting the hyperbolic decay of SP proposed by Sozou
[13].
Relations between delay/probability discount rates and SP
Spearman's correlation coefficients between kd, kp, and ksp
(in the hyperbolic models) were presented in Table 3. A
significant positive correlation was found between kd and
ksp (p < 0.05). This result is consistent with the Sozou's
hypotheses that delay discounting may be related to a
hyperbolic decay of probabilities of obtaining delayed
rewards as delay increases [13]. However, no significant
correlation was found between probability discount rate
(i.e., kp) and decay rate of SP (i.e., ksp). This finding does
not contradict Sozou's theory, because Sozou's theory
does not predict a significant correlation between kp and
ksp [13].
Subjective-probability discounting of delayed reward
Finally, we, as noted, estimated subjective-probability dis-
count rate of delayed reward kspd, based on seven SPs
obtained from SPQ (as an independent variable) and cor-
responding indifference points at the seven delays in the
delay discounting task (as a dependent variable). In order
to test assumption B', we examined the relationship
between kd and kspd at the individual level. Consequently,
we did not observe a significant correlation between kd
and kspd (p > 0.1), implying that delay discounting (impul-
sivity in intertemporal choice) is not totally attributable to
the subjective-probability discounting ("precautious
uncertainty aversion" in intertemporal choice). Likewise,
kspd did not significantly correlate with kp (p > 0.1), also
supporting this conclusion.
Discussion
Relationship between hyperbolic delay and probability 
discounting
Our data on delay and probability discounting were con-
sistent with the previous studies [1-11]. More specifically,
hyperbolic functions better described both delay and
probability discounting, in comparison to exponential
functions [1-11]. The relationship between delay and
probability discounting within subjects (i.e. correlation
between kd and kp) was not significant, as reported in some
previous studies [8,22]. Regarding probability discount-
ing, the group median kp = 1.017 was approximately equal
to 1, indicating that participants' subjective value of the
probabilistic reward (in the probability discounting task)
was approximately equal to a statistical expected value in
the present study.
Hyperbolic decay of subjectively estimated probability of 
winning delayed rewards
Interestingly, our data indicate that SP as a function of
delay decays hyperbolically, rather than exponentially,
which is consistent with Sozou's theory (multiple inter-
The solid (red) and dotted (blue) curves are the hyperbolic  and exponential functions respectively, best fitted to the  experimental data in delay and probability discounting tasks  (a-b) (see Methods) Figure 1
The solid (red) and dotted (blue) curves are the hyperbolic 
and exponential functions respectively, best fitted to the 
experimental data in delay and probability discounting tasks 
(a-b) (see Methods). Fig. 1a: Vertical axis indicates group 
median of indifference point in delay discounting task (dis-
counted present value) and horizontal axis indicates delay 
(days). Data points are represented by the black diamonds. 
Fig. 1b: Vertical axis indicates group median of indifference 
point in probability discounting task (certainty equivalent dis-
counted value) and horizontal axis indicates odds-against = 
(1/probability)-1 (an average waiting time in Rachlin's virtually-
repeated gambling [17]). Note that hyperbolic models (red) 
better fit than exponential models (blue) (see Table 1 for 
AICc for each model).
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Table 1: AICc (Akaike Information Criterion with small sample 
correction) for exponential and hyperbolic functions in delay and 
probability discounting, and SP (subjective probability of 
obtaining delayed rewards)
Exponential Hyperbolic
Delay discounting 92.33 86.49
Probability 
discounting
90.59 82.33
SP (subjective 
probability)
-6.7 - 14.37
Hyperbolic functions better fit behavioral data in delay and 
probability discounting and SP. Note that smaller AICc indicates 
better fitting.Behavioral and Brain Functions 2007, 3:52 http://www.behavioralandbrainfunctions.com/content/3/1/52
Page 7 of 11
(page number not for citation purposes)
ruption/hazard rates model, see Appendix III) [13]. There
was also a significant positive correlation between delay
discount rate (kd) and subjective probability decay rate
(ksp). To our knowledge, this study is the first to demon-
strate the hyperbolic decay of the subjective probability of
obtaining a delayed reward is related to hyperbolic delay
discounting. Notably, previous studies [9,12], measured
subjective certainty for the delayed rewards with a1-10
point rating scale and observed that the stated certainty
was decreased as delay increased. Our results are qualita-
tively consistent with their findings.
Quantitatively, however, because (a) Patak and Reynolds'
studies did not assess values of subjective probabilities
[12], (b) psychological certainty is non-linearly related to
a subjective-probability value [23], and the functional
forms of subjective certainty for delayed rewards were not
assessed in the studies, it is impossible to directly compare
our present data with their data.
It is important to note that both Patak and Reynolds [12]
and Sozou [13] hypothesized that the reason for delay dis-
counting is an increase in subjective uncertainty inevitably
associated with an increase in delay until receipt. This
speculation logically indicates that subjects with large
delay-discount rates (e.g., addicts, substance abusers and
Table 3: Spearman's correlations between the discount rates in 
delay discounting (kd), probability discounting (kp), and decay 
rate of SP (ksp)
Probability 
discounting (kp)
Decay rate of SP (ksp)
Delay discounting 
(kd)
rho(27) = 0.20, p = 
0.30
rho(24) = 0.467*, p = 0.016
Probability 
discounting (kp)
rho(25) = -0.01, p = 0.976
A significant correlation between delay discounting and decay rate of 
SP was observed (Spearman's rank-order correlation, *:p < 0.05). 
Note that a (hyperbolic) decay rate of SP (subjective probability of 
obtaining a delayed reward) as a function of delay (ksp) is defined in 
SP(D) = 1/(1+kspD) (see [13]).
Table 2: Each subject's delay (kd) and probability (kp) discount rates and decay rate ksp of subjective probability of obtaining delayed 
rewards (SP).
Subject's ID kd kp ksp Subject's ID kd kp ksp
1 0.000620 1.3047 n.a. 16 0.001757 0.9972 0.012409
2 0.000320 1.5601 0.025945 17 0.000455 1.0612 0.027894
3 0.002862 1.3140 0.007099 18 0.000928 1.0243 0.000631
4 0.000385 1.1339 n.a.1 9 n.a. 0.4244 0.000116
5 0.004214 1.1543 0.025158 20 0.000144 1.4166 n.a.
6 0.000388 0.3495 0.022878 21 0.000053 0.6046 0.000333
7 0.000645 1.6229 0.002207 22 0.000378 0.5443 0.013914
8 0.004837 2.8802 0.002156 23 0.000224 24.9100 0.225340
9 0.001377 0.5892 0.000737 24 0.000115 0.8915 0.000031
10 0.021098 1.4429 0.000059 25 0.000170 1.3478 0.000002
11 0.008886 1.1245 0.017660 26 0.001646 3.4975 0.000026
12 0.035444 1.5373 0.028255 27 0.054930 0.9969 0.027064
13 0.000131 2.1120 0.000030 28 0.000052 0.7414 0.000347
14 0.000035 0.6274 0.000038 29 0.004808 0.0337 0.312700
15 0.000000062 0.5930 0.000640 30 0.001757 1.0714 0.015360
Median 0.000489 1.0170 0.001395
Note that all k parameters were estimated with hyperbolic functions (not with exponential functions). n.a. indicates failure in estimating parameters 
in nonlinear regression [20].
Vertical axis indicates group median of SP(D) (i.e., subjective  probability of obtaining a reward at delay D) and horizontal  axis indicates delay (days) Figure 2
Vertical axis indicates group median of SP(D) (i.e., subjective 
probability of obtaining a reward at delay D) and horizontal 
axis indicates delay (days). The solid (red) and dotted (blue) 
curves are the hyperbolic and exponential functions respec-
tively, best fitted to the SP(D) obtained in SPQ (see Meth-
ods). Note that hyperbolic decay model (red) proposed by 
Sozou [13] better fit data than exponential decay model 
(blue) (see Table 1 for AICc for each model).
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ADHDs) are dramatically risk-averse, and precautious.
However, we did not observe significant relationship
between subjective-probability discounting for delayed
rewards (kspd) and delay discounting (kd). This finding
does not support that the subjective value of a delayed
reward equals the subjective-probability-discounted value
of the delayed reward [13]. Psychologically speaking,
impulsive subjects (i.e., subjects with greater delay dis-
counting) may not necessarily be precautious and risk-
aversive in decision over time. Therefore, it may be possi-
ble that other psychological factors than aversion to sub-
jective uncertainty associated with delay; for instance,
"impatience"; i.e., pure preference for more immediate
rewards in the absence of aversion to uncertainty (also
referred to as "pure time preference"), are involved in
delay discounting [6]. As noted in the introduction, our
results may collectively imply that a delay in intertempo-
ral choice induces both delay discounting and an increase
in subjective uncertainty (a decrease in SP) via at least two
distinct psychological processes. This present hypothesis
states that subjects with large delay-discount rates may
have strong aversion to delay (i.e., waiting time), rather
than risk-averse or precautious tendencies.
With respect to the hypebolicity of SP(D) function, it is
noteworthy that another account for the observed hyper-
bolic decay of SP(D) is possible. Namely, if we assume
that there is only a single (exponential) interruption rate
ks but a subject has a logarithmic-time perception: τ(D) =
αln(1 + βD) (τ : subjective delay as a function of objective
delay, α and β are free parameters indicating psychophys-
ical effects) in intertemporal choice [7], the resulting func-
tion of SP(D) may be (general-) hyperbolic. This can be
shown as:
SP(D) = exp(-ksτ(D)) = 1/(1+βD)ksα.
Actually, a recent neuroimaging study reported that the
delay length in intertemporal choice is represented in
dopaminergic brain regions such as the caudate, indicat-
ing that subjects discount delayed rewards with psycho-
logical time [10,24]. Together, it can be hypothesized that
when people discount delayed rewards, first, delay is psy-
chophysically transformed into a subjective time-dura-
tion, and second, (a) delay discounting (with the
subjective time-duration of delay) and (b) the estimation
of SP (with the subjective time-duration of delay) occur
via distinct psychological processes in a parallel manner.
These possibilities should be explored in future studies,
since intake/abstinence of addictive dopaminergic drugs
dramatically affects time-perception, which may be asso-
ciated with substance misuser's impulsivity in intertem-
poral choice [7,10].
Collectively, our present findings indicate that "pure time
preference" (i.e., pure delay-discount rate without the
effect of subjective uncertainty associated with delay) may
be calculated as: [(degree of discounting of a delayed
reward due to both delay per se and subjective uncertainty
associated with delay)-(degree of discounting an uncer-
tain reward due to uncertainty alone without delay)] =
[kspd-kp], because the effects of individual differences in SP
at each delay are eliminated in the estimation of kspd by
nonlinear curve fitting of the subjective probability decay
function and delays are fixed across subjects in the delay
discounting task. If this parameter is positive, the subject
has "pure time preference" in economics' sense (i.e.,
"impatience" in temporal discounting). In contrast, a con-
ventional delay discount rate kd may possibly be under the
effects of both pure time preference and aversion to sub-
jective uncertainty associated with delay [6]. It should be
noted that the difference between conventional delay and
probability discounting rates = kd-kp cannot be utilized for
this aim, because there are individual differences in the
estimation of subjective probability of obtaining a
delayed reward. Together, it may be recommendable for
future psychopharmacological studies on discounting by
substance abusers to employ the pure time preference rate
(= kspd-kp) as an impatience parameter in intertemporal
choice, in order to assess impatience in substance abusers
and ADHDs.
Previous neuroimaging studies of intertemporal choice
reported that reward-processing brain regions are acti-
vated when choosing immediate rewards [15,16]. How-
ever, these findings cannot exclude the possibility that
these activations were due to higher degrees of certainty
for more immediate rewards in comparison to more
delayed rewards, because other neuroimaging studies
demonstrated that these brain regions were also activated
during decision-making under uncertainty (not intertem-
poral decision-making) [25]. This problem might be
resolved by utilizing the pure time preference parameter
proposed above in future neuroimaging studies.
Limitation and future direction
Because the present study employed hypothetical money,
it is not completely defendable that discounting behavior
of real monetary rewards was reflected in the present
study. Nevertheless, our results may be extendable to real
rewards, because (a) discounting both hypothetical and
real monetary gains follow a hyperbolic function [1-11],
(b) previous studies have not observed a significant differ-
ence in the k parameter for hypothetical and real money
rewards in a delay discounting task [26], and (c) the
degrees of discounting hypothetical and real monetary
gains correlated strongly [27]. Furthermore, SP at the
delay of one year (about 60%) is larger than that in Patak
and Reynolds' study [12] (smaller than 4 in the 1–10Behavioral and Brain Functions 2007, 3:52 http://www.behavioralandbrainfunctions.com/content/3/1/52
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point scale of which median value is (1+10)/2 = 5.5). This
might be explained by (i) a confounding probabilistic fac-
tor in Patak and Reynolds' study [12]; specifically, one of
the choices by participant in the delay discounting task
was probabilistically honored in the study [12] and/or (ii)
a hypothetical nature of the present study. Future studies
should examine this point.
Conclusion
Our present study has demonstrated that (i) subjective
probability of obtaining a delayed reward (SP) decays
hyperbolically, rather than exponentially, (ii) decay of SP
is associated with delay discounting, but not with subjec-
tive-probability discounting, (iii) delay discounting is not
completely attributable to subjective-probability dis-
counting, (iv) the difference between subjective-probabil-
ity discounting of a delayed reward and probability
discounting may be a parameter of pure time preference.
Future studies should examine whether the pure time
preference parameter differs between healthy controls and
impulsive psychiatric patients such as substance abusers
[1-4,9,10] and ADHDs, who are characterized by strong
temporal discounting, hypofunctioning dopaminergic
systems, and impaired time-perception [28,29].
Appendix I. Impulsivity and inconsistency in 
intertemporal choice
There are two distinct behavioral tendencies in intertem-
poral choice [6,7,14]; i.e., impulsivity and inconsistency.
First, suppose the following example 1 for demonstrating
impulsivity. Agent A who prefers "one apple available one
year later" over "two apples available [one year plus one
week] later" is more impulsive than agent B who prefers
"two apples available [one year plus one week] later" over
"one apple available one year later". In this example 1,
most people may behave as the patient agent B. It is to be
noted that both impulsive agent A and patient agent B
may be rational, because, in this example 1 alone, there is
no inconsistency even in impulsive agent A's behavior.
Next, suppose the intertemporal choice example 2. There
are two options: "one apple available now" and "two
apples available one week later". In example 2, most peo-
ple (who planned to choose the later option in example
1) simultaneously tend to prefer "one apple available
now" over "two apples available one week later".
Although the single impulsive choice of the sooner reward
in the example 2 alone is not irrational, the combination
of these two intertemporal choices in example 1 (choos-
ing the later) and example 2 (choosing the sooner) is
inconsistent. The reason is that the time-intervals between
sooner and delayed rewards are the same (i.e., 7 days) in
the two intertemporal choice problems. This inconsist-
ency between intertemporal choice plans and actions is
problematic in that even if the agent had made patient
and forward-looking plans about the distant future (as in
example 1), her choice plan will, as the time of executing
the plan approaches to the present, be canceled and a
more impulsive alternative will be chosen, as shown in
example 2 (referred to as "preference reversal"). Behavio-
ral neuroeconomic studies have demonstrated that this
inconsistency may explain various problematic behaviors
such as loss of self-control, a failure in formerly-planned
abstinence from addictive substances and relapse. Mathe-
matically, the inconsistency is expressed as time-depend-
ency of a time-discount rate in hyperbolic discounting
(see Appendix II).
Appendix II. Mathematical characteristics of 
discount models
The degree to which a subject discounts a delayed reward
(degree of discounting) is parameterized with a discount
rate, defined as -(dVD/dD)/VD (VD : the subjective value of
the delayed reward, D : the delay to the receipt of the
reward) [6]. Standard economic theory assumes that the
discount rate is independent of delay and the size and the
sign of the delayed outcome [6]. A notable distinction
between the exponential and hyperbolic discount func-
tions exists in consistency in delay discounting; in expo-
nential discounting, a discount rate kd (= -(dVD /dD)/V > 0,
because dVD /dD < 0 when a subject discounts a delayed
reward) is independent of D (kept constant over time),
which confirms a consistency of intertemporal choice
within a subject. On the contrary, in hyperbolic discount-
ing, a discount rate defined as -(dVD/dD)/V = kd /(1+kdD)
is a decreasing function of delay D. It is important to note
that impulsivity in intertemporal choice corresponds to
large discount rates, while inconsistency corresponds to a
time-derivative of a discount rate = (d/dD) [-(dVD/dD)/V].
It is to be noted that "preference reversal" illustrated in
Appendix I is due to a change in the discount rate (defined
above) over 1 year. Specifically, devaluation of delayed
rewards (two apples) over 7 days is greater for example 2
than for example 1 in Appendix I.
Because, in most discounting literature, the term "a hyper-
bolic discount(ing) rate" refers to a discount rate at delay
D = 0 (i.e., -(dVD/dD)/V|D = 0 = kd), we followed this termi-
nology throughout the manuscript. Note that impulsivity
in intertemporal choice corresponds to a larger discount
rate; while inconsistency corresponds to a more rapid
decrease in a discount rate as delay increases (see Appen-
dix I for a distinction between impulsivity and inconsist-
ency). Furthermore, normative decision theory and
microeconomics also assume that the discount rate is
independent of the sign (i.e., gain or loss) and the magni-
tude of delayed outcomes. Behavioral economic and psy-
chopharmacological studies have revealed that these
assumptions are also violated in intertemporal choice by
humans [1-11].Behavioral and Brain Functions 2007, 3:52 http://www.behavioralandbrainfunctions.com/content/3/1/52
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Appendix III. Sozou's hypothesis
Biologically, one of the most intuitive accounts for delay
discounting is that delayed rewards are discounted simply
because more delayed rewards are more uncertain. Sup-
pose that probability of obtaining delayed rewards
decreases at an unknown single time-constant rate (a sin-
gle interruption rate model). In this model, a subjective
probability of obtaining a delayed reward (SP) is the fol-
lowing exponential decay function [13]:
SP(D) = exp(-kspD)
where ksp indicates a decay rate of SP as delay D increases
(SP = 1 when D = 0). Note that larger ksp corresponds to
steeper decay of SP, and ksp is equal to delay D at which SP
= 1/e in the single interruption rate model. Therefore, the
statistical expected value of a delayed reward in the single
interruption model is the following exponential discount-
ing.
VD(D) = V(0) SP(D) = V(0)exp(-kspD),
where ksp is the single interruption rate. However, this sin-
gle interruption rate model cannot explain empirically
observed hyperbolic discounting behavior. In order to
solve this problem, the evolutionary theorist Sozou pro-
posed that there are time-independent multiple interrup-
tion rates following the exponential distribution:
f(l) = (1/ksp)exp(-l/ksp)
where 0 <l < 8 indicates each interruption rate and ksp is a
parameter of the exponential distribution function. In this
multiple interruption-rate model, when all interruption
rates (ls) are summed by weighting with the exponential
distribution, SP(D) becomes the following hyperbolic
decay function:
where ksp corresponds to a hyperbolic probability decay
rate. Note that larger ksp indicates steeper decay of SP as a
function of delay (SP(D)). Therefore, the statistical
expected value of a delayed reward in the multiple inter-
ruption rates model is the hyperbolic delay-discounting
function:
VD(D) = V(0) SP(D) = V(0)/(1+kspD),
where a (subjective) probability decay rate ksp equals the
hyperbolic delay-discounting rate. Because Sozou's theory
is only one framework which can incorporate uncertainty
aversion into hyperbolic delay discounting, we utilized
this framework in the present study, in order to examine
the relationship between delay discounting, probability
discounting, and a decay of subjective probability.
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